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MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY THEORY WITHOUT EXPECTED 
UTILITY FOUNDATIONS 
JOHN M. MIYAMOTO 
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 
PETER WAKKER 
University of Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands 
(Received May 1993; revision received September 1994; accepted April 1995) 
Methods for determining the form of utilities are needed for the implementation of utility theory in specific decisions. An important 
step forward was achieved when utility theorists characterized useful parametric families of utilities and simplifying decompositions 
of multiattribute utilities. The standard development of these results is based on expected utility theory which is now known to be 
descriptively invalid. The empirical violations of expected utility impair the credibility of utility assessments. This paper shows, 
however, that parametric and multiattribute utility results are robust against the major violations of expected utility. They retain their 
validity under nonexpected utility theories that have been developed to account for actual choice behavior. To be precise, charac- 
terizations of parametric and multiattribute representations are extended to rank-dependent utility, state-dependent utility, Choquet- 
expected utility, and prospect theory. 
( lassically important economic analyses made essential 
.-use of assumptions drawn from expected utility the- 
ory. Examples include results on stochastic dominance and 
risk aversion that were obtained by Pratt (1964), Arrow 
(1965), and others. The surprising discovery of Machina 
(1982) was that these results could be obtained in almost 
complete generality without requiring assumptions from 
expected utility theory. Another achievement of expected 
utility theory was the development of an operational meth- 
odology of utility analysis in which simple preference as- 
sumptions were shown to characterize tractable families of 
utilities, like exponential functions and additive functions 
of several attributes. This analytical power has been ex- 
traordinarily useful not only as a theoretical tool, but also 
in applied decision analyses where domain-specific utilities 
must be formulated. 
This paper shows that, once again, results that were 
developed within the expected utility framework, can be 
extended to many forms of nonexpected utility. Specifi- 
cally, characterizations of well known families of paramet- 
ric utilities can be obtained in prospect theory, in the 
several rank-dependent theories, in the probability trans- 
formation theories of Edwards (1962) and Handa (1977), 
and, in effect, in all theories that deal with probabilities in 
a nonlinear way. Similarly, the standard multiattribute util- 
ity results can be extended to the nonexpected utility the- 
ories just mentioned. Our characterizations of utility 
models are based on the weakest assumptions presently 
available. The assumptions adopted in our analysis are 
compatible with either an expected or nonexpected utility 
basis. For expected utility, our results extend Wakker 
(1989, Section VII.7) to the case of arbitrary intervals.1 We 
also extend Wakker's results to nonexpected utility mod- 
els. Our main results also generalize Miyamoto's (1988) 
analysis of utility models, showing that the classes of utility 
representations axiomatized within the weak, "generic" 
utility theory of that paper can be axiomatized on an even 
weaker, and hence, more general basis. Similarly, we gen- 
eralize Dyckerhoff (1994) who provided results for the de- 
composition of multiattribute utilities that were similar to 
Miyamoto (1988), and extended these to the multilinear 
case. For weighted utility and SSB theory, multiattribute 
decomposition results were given in Fishburn (1984) and 
characterizations of parametric families (including the lin- 
ear/exponential family) were given in Fishburn (1994). 
Our results have rather surprising implications for state- 
dependent utility. When standard preference axioms for 
parametric and multiattribute utilities are combined with as- 
sumptions for a state-dependent utility, we find that state- 
dependence is no longer possible. In other words, the 
assumptions for a state-dependent utility theory, which are 
strictly weaker than assumptions that imply state-inde- 
pendence, become equivalent in power to state-independence 
when combined with standard preference axioms for para- 
metric or multiattribute utility models. Whereas the prob- 
lem of identifying probabilities in a state-dependent utility 
theory has proven to be quite subtle (Kadane and Winkler 
1988), our main results for state-dependent utility identify 
unique probabilities. This "solution" is unlikely to be at- 
tractive to proponents of state-dependent utility theory, 
however, because our assumptions eliminate state depen- 
dence. What our results show for state-dependent utility is 
that the development of a viable theory of utility analysis 
will be more difficult than has previously been recognized, 
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for the standard utility analytic assumptions preclude state 
dependence. Our results apply to the state-dependent ex- 
pected utility approach initiated by Karni (1985), and to 
the state- and rank-dependent approach that was initiated 
by Segal (1993), and extended by Green and Jullien (1988) 
and Chew and Wakker (1996). An elaboration of the state- 
dependent case is given in example ic for expected utility 
and in example 4 for nonexpected utility. 
Finally, we note that our main results carry implications 
for the logical and pedagogical development of utility anal- 
ysis. In the traditional approach, an initial set of axioms is 
adopted that imply expected utility maximization with re- 
spect to a utility of arbitrary form. Other postulates are 
then introduced that specify a particular form of utility. 
This line of development reflects the history of the subject, 
where expected utility foundations were laid in the 1940s 
and 1950s, and axioms for specific utility models were in- 
vestigated in the 1960s and 1970s. Our main results show 
that this is not the most efficient, or conceptually econom- 
ical approach. Insofar as the goal of utility analysis is to 
formulate assumptions that determine a specific form of 
utility, one can begin with weak assumptions that imply 
only the additive representability of utility on rank-ordered 
acts. Familiar postulates can then be introduced to specify 
a particular form of utility. State independence and identi- 
fication of probabilities are obtained as useful byproducts 
of this analysis. This approach exploits the full power of 
postulates that specify particular utility forms, eliminating 
"foundational" assumptions that become redundant in the 
context of these postulates. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 
states elementary definitions and assumptions concerning 
an additive representation for preferences over rank-ordered 
acts. The initial formal development is restricted to a par- 
ticularly simple space of acts, namely, rank-ordered acts 
over a state space with only two states of nature. As we will 
show in Section 5, the representation theorems that we 
provide for rank-ordered acts over two states naturely ex- 
tend to arbitrarily many states of nature. The initial 
restriction to two states has the further advantage of 
making the exposition more simple and transparent with- 
out sacrificing generality or power. Sections 2-4 develop 
utility representations on this elementary basis, for two 
states of nature. Section 2 characterizes the log/power and 
linear/exponential utilities for one-dimensional outcomes, 
Section 3 characterizes additive and multiplicative repre- 
sentations for two-dimensional outcomes, and Section 4 
characterizes additive, multiplicative, and multilinear rep- 
resentations for n-dimensional outcomes. The usefulness 
of these results is demonstrated in Section 5, where classi- 
cal utility results are extended to a large class of nonex- 
pected utility theories. Appendix A shows how to replace 
the assumption of additive representability in Section 1 
with an equivalent set of qualitative preference assump- 
tions. Appendix B shows how monotonicity conditions, as- 
sumed in the derivations of multiattribute results (Sections 
3 and 4) can be relaxed. Proofs are given in Appendix C. 
1. ELEMENTARY DEFINITIONS 
Let {s, t} be a state space, with two distinct states (of 
nature). One state is the true state, the other is not true; it 
is not known which state is true. For example, the states 
might describe the result of tossing a coin, with s referring 
to heads and t to tails. We consider the general setup of 
decision under uncertainty, so we neither assume nor pre- 
clude that probabilities for s and t are given beforehand. 
Extensions to more than two states are given in Section 5. 
Let C denote a set of outcomes, and let C2 = C X C 
denote the set of acts, i.e., f = (fsn ft) ( C2 is the act 
yielding f, if s is true and ft if t is true. Throughout the 
paper, C is a convex subset of IRn, and more specific 
assumptions about C will be adopted in subsequent 
sections. 
Let > denote a binary relation on C2, whose interpreta- 
tion is that of a preference relation among acts. We as- 
sume that > is a weak order, i.e., it is transitive and 
complete (for all acts f, g, f > g or g > f ). As usual, we 
write f> g if f > g but not g > f, f - g if f > g and g > 
f, f -< g if g > f, and f : g if g > f. Preferences over 
riskless outcomes are represented as preferences over con- 
stant acts. For example, if x, y E C, then x > y is short for 
(x, x) > (y, y). Our main results concern the set of rank- 
ordered acts, denoted C , and defined as the set {fa E C2: 
As > ft}. Note that this set contains the constant acts. 
In Section 5, the utility results of the paper are applied to 
several utility theories. In all the described applications, there 
exists an additive representation for > on C2, i.e., there exist 
functions Us: C -> IR and U,: C -> IR such that the map fi 
U,(f,) + U,(f) preserves > on C2 . Therefore this additive 
representation is assumed in the main body of the text; axi- 
oms for the representation are stated in Lemma 1 of Appen- 
dix A. As an example, we briefly describe the application of 
our results to rank-dependent utility, which is described more 
fully in example 3a. On the subset of rank-ordered 50-50 
lotteries (0.5, x; 0.5, y) for which x > y, rank-dependent utility 
evaluates lotteries by the function 4(0.5)U(x) + (1 - 
4(O.5))U(y), for some "transformed probability" 4(0.5). The 
rank-ordered 50-50 lotteries are isomorphic to C-, hence 
the main results of this paper can be applied, resulting in 
characterizations of parametric and multiattribute utility 
models for rank-dependent utility. 
We assume that the functions Us and U, are continuous, 
and that both Us and U, preserve the ordering > on C. 
This implies outcome monotonicity, i.e., for any f, g E C i 
if ft > g, and ft > gt, then f > g, where the consequent 
preference is strict if either antecedent preference is strict. 
The utility assumptions investigated in this paper will im- 
ply (and not presuppose) a further decomposition, namely 
that Us and U, are linear with respect to each other, and 
hence can be rewritten as Us = 7rU and U, = 7TU, where 
U: C -> IR. The constants 7r and 7rt are decision weights 
that are positive and sum to one; the function U is a utility 
(function). The decision weights need not be interpreted 
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as probabilities; in particular cases, such as in rank- 
dependent utility, the decision weights may have an inde- 
pendent interpretation within a nonexpected utility theory. 
We summarize the assumptions of this paper as follows. 
Structural Assumption 1. The relation > is a weak order 
on C2, the set of acts. There exists an additive representation 
f i-> U5(f5) + Ut(ft) on the rank-ordered set = {(f5, ft) 
C C2: fs > f}; both Us and Ut are continuous and preserve 
> on the constant acts. 
2. PARAMETRIC FAMILIES OF UTILITIES 
In this section we consider one-dimensional outcomes and 
assume that larger outcomes are preferred to smaller ones, 
i.e., for all x, y C C, 
x Lynx :y,. (1) 
This condition is called monotonicity; it implies strict in- 
creasingness of U, and Ut. 
Our first analysis concerns the characterization of the 
increasing linear/exponential utilities, defined as the family 
of utilities U: C -> IR such that one of the following holds: 
U: x-aeAx + T, for a > 0, A > 0, andT C IR; (2) 
U: Xe-rxa + , for a 
> 0 and T E IR (parametrized by A = 0)2; (3) 
U: x-aeAX + T, for a < 0, A < 0, and T E IR. (4) 
The increasing linear/exponential family is characterized 
by invariance under addition of a constant: Constant abso- 
lute risk aversion on C2 : For any E E IR, 
(fs, ft) > (ga, gt)<'(f + E, ft + E) > (g, + E, gt + E) 
(5) 
whenever all acts in question are contained in Cl. 
Theorem 1. Suppose that C is a nondegenerate interval. As- 
sume monotonicity (1), and the Structural Assumption 1. 
Then the following two statements are equivalent: 
i. Constant absolute risk aversion holds on C . 
ii. There exist an increasing linear/exponential utility U: C 
IR and decision weights, Tr, and irt, such that (ff, ft) H > 
iT5U(f5) + rTtU(ft) represents > on C2. 
Next, we turn to the characterization of the increasing 
log/power utilities. Let C be a strictly positive interval, i.e., 
C C IR++ (IR++ denotes the set of strictly positive real 
numbers). The increasing log/power functions are defined 
as the family of utilities U: C -- IR such that one of the 
following holds: 
U: XhaxEA + T, for a > 0, A > 0, and T E IR; (6) 
U: x- *a log(x) + T, for a 
> 0 and T E IR (parametrized by A = 0); (7) 
U: x~axA + , forof< 0, A <0, and i EJR. (8) 
This family of utilities is characterized by invariance under 
multiplication by positive real numbers: Constant relative 
risk aversion on C2 : For any E > 0, 
(f"d ft) > (g" gt)<*(6tf eft) > (ings egt) (9) 
whenever all acts in question are contained in CI. 
Theorem 2. Suppose that C C IR,, is a nondegenerate 
interval. Assume monotonicity (1), and the Structural As- 
sumption 1. Then the following two statements are equiva- 
lent: 
i. Constant relative risk aversion holds on C2. 
ii. There exist a log/power utility U: C -> IR and decision 
weights, 7Ts and 7t, such that (fs, ft) | irsU(fs) + 
wtU(ft) represents > on C2. 
3. MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY FOR TWO FACTORS 
In this section C - C1 X C2 is a product of two nondegen- 
erate intervals, C1 and C2.3 That is, we deal with two prod- 
uct structures, first, the two-dimensional structure of C 
that comprises all combinations of the attributes from C1 
and C2, and, second, the two-dimensional structure C2 - 
C x C that comprises the set of acts on the two-element 
state space {s, t}. Outcomes in C are denoted as x = (x1, 
x2), or x1x2 for short. Acts are denoted as f = (f, ft) = 
((Ls1 Lf2)A (ft1, ft2)); here the outcome assigned to state s is 
denoted as fsn or (fsll fs2) if reference to the separate 
attributes is important; a similar notation is used for state 
t. When dependence on states s and t need not be explic- 
itly referenced, we also denote acts as (x, y) = (X1X2, YIY2)- 
Hence, subscripts s, t always refer to states and subscripts 1 
and 2 always to attributes. We assume (attribute) 
monotonicity: 
X1 A'Y1, X2 -'Y2, x *Y:=>X >Y - 
The simplest class of multiattribute utilities is the addi- 
tive/multiplicative family. A function U: C -> IR is additive 
if U: x1x2 - > U1(x1) + U2(x2), and multiplicative if U: x1x2 
}-> U1(x1) ^ U2(x2), where U1: C --> IR and U2: C2 -> IR. 
A function is additive/multiplicative if it is either additive or 
multiplicative. The family of additive/multiplicative utilities 
is characterized by a utility independence property, de- 
fined as follows. 
C1 is utility independent on C2 if 
(X1C2, YlC2) > (VlC2, WlC2) 
X::> (10) 
(xld2, yjd2) > (vld2, wjd2) 
whenever all acts in question are contained in C2 . In 
words, if the second attribute of outcomes is fixed at a 
certain level, then preferences are independent of that 
level (c2 or d2). Similarly, C2 is utility independent on C2 
if preferences are independent of a fixed level of the first 
attribute, i.e., 
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(C1X2, C y2) > (C1V2, C1W2) 
r ~~~~~~~~(11) 
(d1X2, d1Y2) > (djV2, djW2) 
whenever all acts in question are contained in C2 . Mutual 
utility independence holds on C2 if each factor is utility 
independent on C2. 
The definition of utility independence given here is the 
same as the standard definition in the multiattribute utility 
literature (Keeney and Raiffa 1976), except that here the 
condition is restricted to rank-ordered acts on a two- 
element state space, C2. 
It is useful to note that the restriction of mutual utility 
independence to the constant acts implies that preferences 
between outcomes are independent of common attributes, 
i.e., x1c2 > y1c2 X xld2 > yjd2 and clx2 > c1y2 X d1x2 > 
d1Y2. This is the well known condition of preference inde- 
pendence (see Keeney and Raiffa); for two factors, the 
topic of this section, it is also implied by attribute 
monotonicity. 
Theorem 3. Suppose that C = C1 X C2 is a product of 
nondegenerate intervals. Assume attribute monotonicity, and 
the Structural Assumption 1. Then the following two state- 
ments are equivalent: 
i. Mutual utility independence holds on C2. 
ii. There exist an additive/multiplicative utility U: C -> IR 
and decision weights, Trs and irt, such that f F-L irsU(fs) + 
irtU(ft) represents > on C . 
Because of monotonicity, the multiplicative form in The- 
orem 3 does not permit changes of sign, i.e., either U is 
strictly positive or strictly negative. The general multiplica- 
tive form in which zeroes and sign reversals can occur is 
more complicated on rank-ordered sets; further comments 
are given in Appendix B. 
Theorem 3 identifies sufficient conditions for the exis- 
tence of an additive or multiplicative representation, but 
it does not distinguish which of the two representations 
is valid. In the expected utility framework, it is well 
known that a condition called marginality is necessary 
and sufficient for an additive representation of attributes 
(Fishburn 1965)-marginality is satisfied if gambles are 
equal in preference whenever the gambles have identical 
marginal probability distributions over attributes. This 
condition cannot be applied in the present analysis be- 
cause it assumes that the utility of a gamble is linear in 
probability, and that the expected utility axioms are 
valid. Indeed, Dyckerhoff showed for rank-dependent util- 
ity that the marginality condition implies expected utility. 
Miyamoto (1988) identified a condition that distinguishes 
additive from multiplicative representations under the 
less restrictive assumptions adopted here. Suppose that 
the assumptions of Theorem 3 are satisfied and mutual 
utility independence holds. Then U is additive if and 
only if the following strengthening of utility indepen- 
dence holds: 
(xia2, yib2) > (via2, wjb2) 
<r~(XlC2, yid2) >_ (VlC2, wid2) (12) 
whenever all acts are contained in C I. U is multiplicative 
if and only if (12) is violated for some acts in Cl. 
4. MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY FOR AN ARBITRARY 
NUMBER OF FACTORS 
Let N = {1, .. ., n} be the first n integers, where n > 2, 
and let C = C1 X ... X Cn, where Ck is a nondegenerate 
interval for every k E N. Each outcome x E C is an 
n-tuple, x = (x1, . . ., Xn), and the set of acts is the double 
product set (C1 X ... X Cn )2. In addition, we assume (at- 
tribute) monotonicity, i.e., 
xl yo .-: . . n Xn L-_Ynn X Y:Z>X >y Y 
The two-factor additive and multiplicative representations 
that were studied in the previous section have three natu- 
ral generalizations when n factors are introduced. A func- 
tion U: C -> IR is additive if there exist Uj: Cj -> IR such 
that U: (X1, .. . , X jn) ?- >1 Uj(xj), and a function U: C 
IR is multiplicative if there exist Uj: Cj -> IR such that U: 
(x1, .. ., Xn) -* j> j=l Uj(xj). The third generalization, the 
multilinear case, is defined later in this section. 
For J C N, and outcomes x, y, let xjy denote the out- 
come with attribute levels x; for j E J and yj for j ? J. Cj 
is utility independent on C2 if the following holds: 
(Xjc, yjc) > (vjc, wjc)<(xjd, yjd) > (vjd, wjd) (13) 
whenever all acts in question are contained in C2 . Mutual 
utility independence holds on C2 if Cj is utility independent 
on C2 for every J C N. 
As in the two-factor case, the restriction of mutual util- 
ity independence to the constant acts implies that prefer- 
ences between outcomes are independent of common 
attributes, i.e., xjc > yjc < xjd > yjd. This is preference 
independence for dimension n : 2. 
Theorem 4. Suppose that C = Cl X *. X Cn where n : 2 
and every Ck is a nondegenerate interval. Assume attribute 
monotonicity, and the Structural Assumption 1. Then the 
following two statements are equivalent: 
i. Mutual utility independence holds on C2. 
ii. There exist an additive/multiplicative utility U: C -> IR 
and decision weights, Tr, and irt, such that (x, y) H > 
,iTU(x) + irtU(y) represents > on Ci,. 
As in the two-factor case, Theorem 4 does not give the 
most general multiplicative form, because monotonicity ex- 
cludes zeroes and sign reversals. The general multiplicative 
form is discussed in Appendix B. In addition, Theorem 4 
only identifies sufficient conditions for an additive or mul- 
tiplicative representation without indicating which repre- 
sentation is valid. Diagnostic conditions that distinguish 
the additive from the multiplicative representation have 
been given at the end of Section 3, and generalizations to 
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n factors are straightforward. We will not state these gen- 
eralizations here. 
Next we turn to multilinear utilities, the broadest gener- 
alization of the two-dimensional additive/multiplicative 
case to higher dimensions. U: C -> IR is multilinear if 
there exist Uk: Ck -> IR for each k E N and real constants, 
di, for each J C N such that U: x F > EJCN d1 * 1kEGJ Uk(Xk). 
In expected utility theory, a utility on n factors is multi- 
linear if and only if each factor is utility independent. The 
following theorem provides the result under weaker as- 
sumptions, thus permitting the extension to several nonex- 
pected utility theories. 
Theorem 5. Suppose that C = Cl X ... X Cn, where n - 2 
and every Ck is a nondegenerate interval. Assume attribute 
monotonicity, and the Structural Assumption 1. Then the 
following two statements are equivalent: 
i. Each factor Ck is utility independent on CI. 
ii. There exist a continuous multilinear utility U: C -> IR 
and decision weights, Trs and irt, such that (x, y) H > 
1TsU(x) + 1tU(y) represents > on C,. 
More general, nonmonotonic, multilinear forms are dis- 
cussed in Appendix B. 
5. APPLICATIONS AND COMMENTS 
The preceding sections have derived standard utility re- 
sults from a rather slender basis, namely, that there exists 
an additive representation for the preference relation on 
the rank-ordered acts, C2 . The results show that familiar 
utility representations can be characterized by the usual 
assumptions when the assumptions are restricted to rank- 
ordered acts. These results are robust against many of the 
violations of expected utility theory because violations are 
typically demonstrations that preference behavior is incon- 
sistent with the global claims of expected utility theory, 
e.g., with the claim that decision weights are identical to 
stated probabilities and that strong independence assump- 
tions like the sure-thing principle hold. Our results show 
that axiomatizations of standard parametric and multiat- 
tribute utility representations require only the locally addi- 
tive structure within rank-ordered subsets of binary 
lotteries or two-outcome acts, and not the full power of 
expected utility theory. Hence, the techniques of this paper 
make possible the generalization of standard utility results 
to any of the so-called generalized expected utility theories 
that imply additive representations within rank-ordered 
subsets. This section gives several examples to substantiate 
this claim. 
To bring out similarities between different utility theo- 
ries, it is useful to define a common notation, terminology, 
and set of assumptions. We follow the standard terminol- 
ogy in distinguishing between decision under risk (DUR) 
and decision under uncertainty (DUU). In DUR, the pref- 
erence relation > applies to a set P of probability distribu- 
tions over C. For simplicity, we assume throughout that P 
is the set of lotteries, i.e., probability distributions assigning 
a 1.0 probability to a finite subset of C. The notation (Pl, 
xl; ... ; PM. xm) denotes a lottery yielding outcome xi with 
probability pj for all j; we use superscripts to distinguish 
outcomes, because subscripts already refer to attributes of 
outcomes. Except in example 2, we assume that outcome 
monotonicity holds, i.e., if xk , yk for every k, then (Pl, 
x;... ; Pm, XM) > (pi, y1; ... ; PM, ym), where the conse- 
quent preference is strict if Pk> 0 and Xk > yk for some k. 
For any 0 < p < 1, let C"P denote the set of lotteries of 
the form (p,x; 1 -p,y), where x,y E C and x My. CP" is 
isomorphic to C2 under the mapping (p, x; 1 - p, y) 
(x, y). In all of the DUR theories to be discussed, there 
exists an additive representation for > on C"PI, so that our 
main results can be applied under the appropriate regular- 
ity conditions. 
In the case of DUU, the preference relation is over acts, 
which are functions from a state space S to the outcome 
set C. Subsets of S are called events. For simplicity of 
presentation we assume a finite state space S - {s1, . ... 
Sm} for m : 2. We assume that outcome monotonicity 
holds in the sense that if f(sj) > g(s1) for all j, then f > g; 
furthermore, f > g if at least one antecedent preference is 
strict. This implies that no state is null. For any proper 
subset A C S, let (A, x; AC, y) denote the act assigning 
outcome x to all s C A, and y to all s 0 A, and let C1 
denote the set of all such acts where x > y. This set C1 is 
isomorphic to C2 under the mapping (A, x; AC, y) 
(xy). 
In all of the examples, we will indicate how a given 
utility theory implies an additive representation on a sub- 
structure of the form C"b or C41. Our main results can be 
applied to such an additive representation under appropri- 
ate regularity conditions. In each example, the characteriz- 
ing preference conditions, when imposed on all acts, 
obviously imply the preference conditions when restricted 
to substructures CPI or C4, thus imply the restrictions for 
the utilities as obtained before. Note that it actually suf- 
fices, for application of the utility implications derived be- 
fore, that the preference conditions have been established 
only on one two-dimensional substructure CP or C . Con- 
versely, if the utilities are as described in the theorems 
above, then it is easy to show (and will not be elaborated 
here) that the preference conditions do not only hold on 
all substructures CP' or C4, but are extended naturally to 
the entire domain. In that manner, the following examples 
show how standard utility models can be characterized 
within the respective utility theories. As an illustration, we 
make the implied characterization explicit in example 3a, 
where rank-dependent utility is considered for the context 
of risk. 
Example 1. Additive Models 
Example la. Expected utility for DUR (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1944). According to this theory, there exists 
a utility U: C -I JR that represents preferences over prob- 
ability distributions through the expected utility formula. 
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Take any fixed 0 < p < 1. Then the function (p, x; 1 - p, 
y) F-> pU(x) + (1 - p)U(y) is an additive representation 
on CPI to which our utility characterizations apply. 
Example lb. Subjective expected utility for DUU (Savage 
1954). According to this theory, there exists a utility U: 
C -- IR, and a probability measure P on S that represent 
preferences over acts through the expected utility formula. 
Take any fixed event A C S such that 0 < P(A) < 1. The 
function (A, x; Ac, y) -* P(A)U(x) + (1 - P(A))U(y) is 
an additive representation on C41 to which our utility char- 
acterizations apply. 
Examples la and lb add nothing new to the methodol- 
ogy of utility analysis, for the utility characterizations were 
proved much earlier in the expected utility and subjective 
expected utility framework. We mention these examples 
because they make clear the similarity between the utility 
analytic methods in these older theories, and in the theo- 
ries discussed later. 
Example ic. State-dependent subjective expected utility 
for DUU (Karni 1985, 1992). In this theory, an act f is 
evaluated by 
m 
EP(SX)(A~si), Sd) 
L= 1 
where P is a probability measure and U is a state- 
dependent utility function, so-called because the utility of 
an outcome depends on the state with which it is associ- 
ated. For each state s, U(, s) is assumed to be continuous. 
A much discussed problem with this model is that only the 
products P(si)U f(si), si) are inferrible from preferences, 
whereas the components, P(si) and U(f(si), si), are not 
separately identifiable (Dreze 1987, Karni 1985, 1992, 
Kadane and Winkler 1988). To see why this is the case, 
choose an arbitrary positive number for each state, multi- 
ply P(si) by that number, divide U(f(si), si) by that same 
number, and finally renormalize the probabilities. The re- 
sult is another model that describes exactly the same pref- 
erences. Thus, probabilities and utilities are not separately 
identifiable. We pursue this example in some detail be- 
cause our main results provide an avenue by which proba- 
bilities can be obtained. 
Define Uj: x F-> P(sj)U(x, s1) for all j. For convenience, 
we can choose an arbitrary fixed outcome, r E C, and set 
Uj(r) = 0 for all j. The set C11'} contains all acts ({sj}, x; 
{Sj}C, y) with x > y. The function Uj(x) + Yinj Ui(y) is a 
continuous additive representation on Cljs}. Suppose that 
we now assume any of the parametric or multiattribute 
utility axioms of this paper. Then our main results estab- 
lish that Eij Ui(x) =aUj(plus (attribute) monotonicity x) 
+ /3 for some a > 0 and (3, and every x E C. Define U*: x 
ET 1 Ui(x). Noting that 0 = Einj Ui(r) =3, we have 
U*(x) = Uj(x) + aUj(x) for any x E C. Hence, Uj = ) rjU 
where iTrj11(1 + a) > 0. As this holds for every j, 1 - j 
S m, the function f -* zM- rnTU*t(f(s1)) is a state- 
independent representation for the preference order over 
acts. Finally, the rj's may be renormalized to sum to one. 
Thus, the addition of stan- dard parametric or multiat- 
tribute utility assumptions to a state-dependent subjective 
expected utility theory yields an expected utility model 
with decision weights that satisfy the conditions for proba- 
bilities. Of course, it also yields the specification of the 
specific utility model. Whether the decision weights de- 
rived in this analysis can be interpreted as genuine proba- 
bilities is, as always, open to debate. 
Example 2. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979), and other DUR models in which probabilities for 
separate outcomes are transformed. In these theories, a 
continuous utility U: C -- IR is postulated, along with 
a continuous, strictly increasing probability transformation 
function, 4: [0, 1] -- [0, 1], such that 4(0) = 0, and 4(1) = 
1. In the theories of Handa (1977) and Karmarkar (1979), 
a lottery (Pi, xi; ... ; PM, xm) with distinct (nonindifferent) 
outcomes is evaluated by 
m 
E 0 (pi)U(xW). j=l 
For these theories, we may choose any fixed p, 0 < p < 1, 
and the function (p, x; 1 - p, y) }-* >(p)U(x) + 0(1 - 
p)U(y) determines an additive representation on CPJ to 
which our main results apply.4 
In the case of the prospect theory of Kahneman and 
Tversky, the representation is restricted to lotteries with at 
most two nonzero outcomes (outcomes are real numbers 
here). Furthermore, different representations are postu- 
lated for lotteries that have different forms. For our results 
it suffices to restrict attention to the set GP, , containing all 
lotteries (p, x; 1 - p, y) such that x : y > 0, and the set 
LPN,, containing all lotteries (p, x; 1 - p, y) such that 0 > 
x - y. In prospect theory, the value of such lotteries is 
given by 
(p, x; 1 - p, y) >- +(p) U(x) + (1 - +(p)) U(y). 
On either GPl or LPN, our main results apply to yield char- 
acterizations of parametric or multiattribute utility models 
within prospect theory. 
We mention that Kahneman and Tversky treat the dis- 
tinction between gains and losses as a psychological primi- 
tive. The sets GP, and LPI are sets of pure-gain and pure- 
loss lotteries, respectively. Thus, our main results yield 
separate parametric or multiattribute utility axiomatiza- 
tions for gains and for losses, allowing, for instance, that 
preferences for pure-gain lotteries GC7 satisfy constant rel- 
ative risk aversion, but not preferences for pure-loss lotter- 
ies LP', or that both gains and losses satisfy constant 
relative risk aversion, but with a power that is different for 
gains than for losses; such models were discussed in 
Tversky (1967). 
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Example 3. Rank-dependent models. An extension of the 
multiattribute utility results of expected utility to rank- 
dependent utility and Choquet-expected utility is also pro- 
vided by Dyckerhoff. In particular, he also provides the 
result in Corollary ic. 
Example 3a. Rank-dependent utility for DUR (Quiggin 
1982). Several researchers noticed that Handa's probabil- 
ity transformation model implied violations of stochastic 
dominance (Fishburn 1978, Quiggin 1982). This led 
Quiggin to introduce a theory, nowadays called rank- 
dependent utility theory, that allows for transformations of 
probability without violating stochastic dominance. To de- 
scribe the rank-dependent utility representation, first con- 
sider only lotteries of the form (pi, xi; ... ; Pm, xm) such 
that xl > * * > xm. Rank-dependent utility theory postu- 
lates that such lotteries are evaluated by 
E~ L E(k- k) E Pk) U(X1) (14) 
where U: C -> IR is a continuous utility, and w: [0, 1] > 
[0, 1] is a continuous, strictly increasing function satisfying 
w(O) = 0 and w(1) = 1. If the outcomes are not ordered in 
the manner x1 > * > xrn, then they are reordered, and a 
form analogous to (14) is applied. 
For any fixed p, 0 < p < 1, the function (p, x; 1 - p, y) 
F > w(p)U(x) + [1 - w(p)]U(y) is an additive representa- 
tion on CU. Our main results apply within this structure, 
yielding characterizations of standard parametric and mul- 
tiattribute utility models. For illustration, we make these 
characterizations explicit. Note that the assumption of 
rank-dependent utility maximization in Corollary 1 implies 
all conditions of Assumption 1, or their analogues, for the 
present context. 
Corollary 1. Assume that the preference relation over lotter- 
ies is represented by rank-dependent utility. 
a. Suppose that C is a nondegenerate interval and U is 
strictly increasing. Then (Pi' x; .. ; PM, m) > (pi, yl; 
p; P y) < (pi, (x1 + E); . .P M;p, (xm + E)) > 
(P1, (y1 + E); ... ; Pm, (ym + E)) ("constant absolute 
risk aversion") holds if and only if U is linear/exponential. 
b. Suppose that C C IR++ is a nondegenerate interval and 
U is strictly increasing. Then (pi, x1; ... ; PM xm) > (PI, 
a; .. *; PM, Y ) <= (pi, cc1;... ; PM On) > (pE 1 
. P. .; Eym ) holds for any E > 0 ("constant relative risk 
aversion") if and only if U is a log/power utility. 
c. Suppose that C = C1 X ... X Cn, where n D 2 and every 
Ck is a nondegenerate interval. Assume attribute monoto- 
nicity. Then: 
i. Mutual utility independence holds (whenever some at- 
tributes are fixed at certain levels, then preferences over 
lotteries over the remaining attributes are independent 
of the levels just described), if and only if U is an 
additive/multiplicative utility. 
ii. Each factor Ck is utility independent (whenever all but 
one of the attributes are fixed at certain levels, then 
preferences over lotteries over the remaining attribute are 
independent of the levels just described), if and only if U 
is a multilinear utility. 
Example 3b. Choquet-expected utility for DUU. In this 
theory, introduced by Schmeidler (1989), a continuous util- 
ity, U: C -> IR, is chosen along with a capacity, i.e., a 
function W: 25 -> IR such that W(0) = 0, W(S) = 1, and 
A D B D W(A) , W(B). Preferences are represented by 
the Choquet-expected utility form: If f(sl) > *> f(sm) 
then f is evaluated by 
m 
L [W({s1, . . +, s})- W({s1, . . . , Si - D]WASM - j=1 (15) 
If the states do not happen to be ordered in the manner of 
f(s,) > * * > f(sm), they are reordered and a form analo- 
gous to (15) is applied (see Wakker 1989, Chapter VI). Let 
A = {s1, ... ,Sk for 1 S k < m. The function 
(A, x; AC, y)i-,W({s1, . , Sk})U(X) 
+ [1 - W({s1, . * , Sk})]U(Y) (16) 
is an additive representation on C0 to which our main 
results apply. 
Example 4. State- and Rank-Dependent Models 
Example 4a. Here we consider the generalization of rank- 
dependent utility introduced in Segal (1989), and discussed 
in Wakker (1993b) and Segal (1993). A function V: C X 
[0, 1] -* IR is chosen, and a lottery (Pi, x1; .. .; Pm, xm) 
with x1 > * > xm is evaluated by 
E [V( X, E Pk) V(Xi, E Pk) (17) 
As before, for arbitrary lotteries, the outcomes must first 
be rank-ordered, and then (17) applies. The function V 
satisfies V(x, 0) 0 V(r, p) for all x, p with respect to a 
fixed reference outcome r. In addition, V should satisfy 
several other natural conditions.5 For any p, 0 < p < 1, 
the function (p, x; 1 - p, y) - V(x, p) + [V(y, 1) - V(y, 
p)] determines an additive representation on CU to which 
our main results apply. Note also that under any of the 
specifications in our main results, for each fixed 0 < p < 1 
the functions V(x, p) and [V(x, 1) - V(x, p)] are related 
by a strictly increasing affine transformation. Hence, 
V(x, 1) - V(x,p) = a(p)V(x,p) + 13(p) for some a(p) > 
0 and 3(p) E IR. Substitution of x = r and V(r, p) 0 
shows that 13(p) 0, so that V(x, p) = w(p)V(x, 1), for 
w(p) = 1/(1 + a(p)); this equation also holds for p = 0 
andp = 1 if we define w(O) 0  and w(1) = 1. Define also 
U(x) - V(x, 1) for all outcomes x, so that V(x, p) 
w(p)U(x) for all x, p. Now (17) reduces to 
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that is, to rank-dependent utility. Here continuity of U 
follows from continuity of V in outcome, furthermore, if V 
is continuous in probability then so is w, and, finally, joint 
monotonicity of V implies that w is strictly increasing.6 
We find again that, as soon as this model deviates from 
rank-dependent utility, the classical utility characteriza- 
tions are no longer possible. 
Example 4b. Cumulative utility for DUU. This model was 
introduced by Chew and Wakker as a common generaliza- 
tion of all rank-dependent models. It can be interpreted as 
Choquet-expected utility with a state-dependent utility. A 
function V: C X 25 -> IR is chosen. If f(sl) > > ftsm), 
then act f is evaluated by 
m 
E [ VU( Sj), IS 1, *** Sk}) j=1 
- V(f(sj), {Si, . * *, - 1)] * (18) 
If the states are not ordered in the manner of f(sl) 
> * - > f(sm), they can be reordered and a form analo- 
gous to (18) is applied (see Chew and Wakker). The func- 
tion V satisfies V(x, 0)- 0 V(r, A) for all outcomes x 
and events A with respect to a fixed reference outcome r. 
In addition, V should satisfy several other natural condi- 
tions.7 LetA = {s1, ..., Sk} for 1 , k < m. Under these 
specifications, the function (A, x; Ac, y) - V(x, A) + [V(y, 
S) - V(y, A)] is an additive representation on C' to 
which our main results apply. Under the conditions stud- 
ied in our main results, the present model reduces to 
Choquet-expected utility within each maximal comono- 
tonic set in a manner similar to example 4a. For m - 3, 
this then reduces to a Choquet-expected utility representa- 
tion on the set of all acts, as a straightforward implication 
of Wakker and Tversky (1993, Proposition 8.2). 
Let us point out one more reason why it is possible to 
generalize standard results of utility analysis to theories 
based on rank-ordered sets of the form C2, and thus to 
many models that deviate from expected utility theory. 
The characterizing conditions are compatible with rank- 
ordered sets in the following sense: In each characterizing 
condition, the acts in the antecedent preference are rank- 
ordered if and only if the acts in the consequent prefer- 
ence are similarly rank-ordered. This point is obvious, e.g., 
in the case of constant absolute risk aversion which asserts 
that x > y if and only if x + E > y + E. In the case of 
utility independence assumptions, it was noted that mu- 
tual utility independence implies preferential indepen- 
dence. Thus, for example, for two dimensions we have 
x1c > y1c if and only if x1d > y1d, so that a rank-ordered 
set can be defined on the first attribute without regard to 
the elements chosen from the second (or other) attributes; 
this is used at several places in the proofs. Axioms for 
standard parametric and multiattribute utility models re- 
tain their logical force when restricted to rank-ordered sets 
because the constraints that they impose on preferences 
apply to lotteries within the same rank-ordered sets. 
Finally, we note that the results in this paper have been 
presented in the framework of DUR/DUU, with the sj's 
referring to states of nature, but we could equally well 
treat the sj's as referring to persons or to points of time, in 
which case results for welfare theory or for temporal dis- 
counting would obtain. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Our main results provide to the best of our knowledge the 
most general characterization of linear/exponential and log! 
power utility models, and the additive, multiplicative, and 
multilinear utility models within theories of DUR and 
DUU. What is new in our results is not the axioms used to 
characterize these utility models, but the finding that stan- 
dard axioms yield the familiar utility models when added 
to a variety of nonexpected utility theories. Our results 
suggest that much of the methodology of utility analysis, as 
embodied in texts like Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and von 
Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986), can be developed upon 
nonexpected utility foundations. 
APPENDIX A. CHARACTERIZATIONS ENTIRELY IN 
TERMS OF PREFERENCES 
Our results have presupposed an additive representation 
in Structural Assumption 1; the functions Us and U, in this 
representation are called additive value functions. Thus, we 
did not obtain true characterization theorems in the sense 
that the conditions of these theorems were not expressed 
exclusively in terms of a qualitative preference relation. 
Here we describe how to replace the additive representa- 
tion of Structural Assumption 1 with qualitative preference 
assumptions and thus obtain true characterization theo- 
rems. The following conditions are needed. The prefer- 
ence relation > is continuous on C' if the sets {x E C x : X 
> y} and {x E C? : x < y} are closed for all y E C. This 
condition is necessary for continuity of Us and U. The 
preference relation satisfies outcome monotonicity on C' if 
on that set we have 
fs > g, and f, g, =~f > g , (A.1) 
with f > g if one or both antecedent preferences are strict. 
This condition is necessary to guarantee that Us and U, 
preserve the same ordering of outcomes. Finally, the 
Thomsen condition is satisfied on C' if 
(fhft) - (ga gt) and (h8, gt) 
(fs, ht)=>(hs, ft.) - (gs, ht.) (A.2) 
whenever all acts in question are contained in C2 . This 
condition is necessary for the additivity representation. Int 
will denote topological interior. 
Lemma 1. Let C be a convex subset of IR', and let > be a 
weak order on C2 that satisfies continuity, outcome monoto- 
nicity, and the Thomsen condition on C2 . Then there exist 
continuous functions, Us and UT, from Int(C) to JR such 
that f h>Us(fs) + Ut(ft) represents > on [Int(C)]2 . If Us 
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and U, are linear with respect to each other, then the repre- 
sentation can be extended by continuity to the entire set C2. 
The functions Us and Ut are unique up to a positive linear 
transformation with common units. 
Lemma 1 is proved in Wakker (1993a, Theorem 3.3(a), 
Proposition 3.5, and Remark 3.7), where results from ad- 
ditive representation theory are adapted to rank-ordered 
subsets of product sets. The restriction of the additive 
representation to the interior of C2 , or to the case of 
additive value functions that are linear with respect to each 
other, is imposed to avoid the possibility that the functions 
are "driven to infinity" as described in Wakker (1993a, 
Figure 3). 
The following observation shows how characterization 
theorems, entirely in terms of preference conditions, could 
have been obtained in the main body of the text. 
Observation 1. In Theorems 1-5, the Structural Assump- 
tion 1 can be dropped if the assumptions of weak ordering, 
continuity, the Thomsen condition on C2 , and outcome 
monotonicity are added to statement i of each theorem, 
and continuity of the representation is added to each state- 
ment ii. 
APPENDIX B. RELAXING ATTRIBUTE 
MONOTONICITY 
For simplicity of presentation, attribute monotonicity was 
assumed in the study of multiattribute utility. There is in- 
terest, however, in nonmonotonic models, for instance, if 
preferences on some attributes are single-peaked or if some 
attributes are not numerical. As another example, consider 
a health utility model over survival duration and health 
quality. People prefer longer survival to shorter survival in 
good health states, but the opposite preference can occur 
when the health state is extremely bad. Hence, preference 
for survival duration is neither uniformly increasing nor 
uniformly decreasing. 
A simple way to relax attribute monotonicity is to invoke 
preferential independence of single attributes and an es- 
sentiality assumption. An attribute j is essential on C2 if 
xjc > yjc for some xjc, yjc E C2 . If attribute monotonicity 
is dropped from the assumptions of Theorems 3, 4, and 5, 
and replaced by the assumption that at least two attributes 
are essential, then statements i of those theorems imply 
the corresponding statements ii; of course utility indepen- 
dence, which is asserted in the statements i, implies pref- 
erential independence of single attributes. The converse 
implications from statements ii to statements i are no 
longer valid because the multiplicative or multilinear 
forms can produce sign reversals. Sign reversals are pre- 
cluded if single attributes are preferentially independent. 
Under preferential independence of single attributes, one 
can suppress the inessential attributes and rescale the es- 
sential attributes so that attribute monotonicity is satisfied. 
Then the results follow from those in this paper. In sum- 
mary, statements i and ii of Theorems 3, 4, and 5 are 
equivalent if attribute monotonicity is replaced by the as- 
sumption that at least two attributes are essential and Cj is 
preferentially independent on C2 for every j; Dyckerhoff 
gave this result for rank-dependent utility and Choquet- 
expected utility. 
In general multiplicative and multilinear forms, sign 
reversals are possible. For expected utility, this case can 
be characterized by a weakening of utility independence 
to a "generalized utility independence," as advanced by 
Fishburn and Keeney (1974, 1975) for expected utility; see 
also von Stengel (1993). For our context, the generaliza- 
tion seems more complicated. The reason is that the 
generalized utility independence conditions are not com- 
patible with rank-ordering: A crucial point for the deriva- 
tion of the results in this paper was that all preference 
conditions that we used did not affect rank-ordering. 
For the multiattribute results, there is also interest in 
nonnumerical attributes; for example, attributes of health 
may not have a quantitative description. In this case, es- 
sentiality and preferential independence conditions re- 
place attribute monotonicity, and a richness condition is 
imposed to guarantee that the range of representing func- 
tions is an interval, e.g., through continuity with respect to 
a connected topology. 
APPENDIX C. PROOFS 
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof that statement i of the 
theorem is necessary for statement ii is routine, and will be 
omitted. Therefore, let us assume that statement i holds, 
and prove that statement ii holds. By Lemma 1, statement 
ii of the theorem is proved if we can prove it for the case 
where C is open, therefore we assume that C is open. For 
any E C IR', let CE {x E C: x + E C C}, and letJ = 
{ E C IRt: CE is a nondegenerate interval}. Because C is a 
nondegenerate interval, J is also a nondegenerate interval. 
For every E C J, x h-> U,(x + E) and x - U,(x + E) are 
additive value functions for the same preference relation 
on (CE)2 as Us and Ut, by constant absolute risk aversion. 
By the uniqueness results of Lemma 1, for each E C J 
there exist constants, 0-E > 0, aT, and T< (the E's are super- 
scripts and not exponents), such that for all x C Ce: 
U,(x + E) = o-EUs(x) + TE (C.1) 
U, (X + E) o 0E Ut (X) + Tt * (C.2) 
Equation C.1 is a functional equation that holds if and 
only if Us is linear or exponential. This can be proved from 
the results in Miyamoto (1983) by substituting x' = 
exp(x), E' = exp(E), and Us(x) = Us(log(x)). Under these 
substitutions, (C.1) becomes Us(x'E') - CEUS(xf) + E. 
The constants Se and Ts can be taken as constants depend- 
ing on E', therefore Miyamoto's (1983) formulas (10/10), 
(21), and (22) apply to the equation in this form; they yield 
linear/exponential functions as the unique solutions to 
(C.1). We note in passing that Miyamoto's result general- 
izes similar results in Pfanzagl (1959) and Aczel (1966) to 
domains that are arbitrary intervals. A similar argument 
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shows that linear/exponential functions are the only solu- 
tions to (C.2). Let As, as, and T be the parameters of the 
linear/exponential function that solves (C.1), and let At, ao, 
and Tr, be the parameters of the linear/exponential func- 
tion that solves (C.2). Note that a'e appears in both (C.1) 
and (C.2). If o-' 1, then Us and U, are linear, and hence, 
0 = As = At. If o-r is nonconstant as a function of E, then Us 
and Ut are nonlinear, and hence, a' = exp(ASE) 
exp(AtE). Therefore As = At 0 0 in this case. Define U 
by U: x | > exp(Ax) for A = As = At, 7Ts = asl(as + at), 
and ?nt = atl(as + at) in the exponential case, or U: x x, 
Ts= asJ(a5 + at), and Tt = al/(a5 + at) in the linear case. 
Now, f | ir5U(fs) + irtU(ft) represents > on C . 
Proof of Theorem 2. The theorem follows from Theorem 1 
by substituting fs = log(fs) and ft = log(ft). We give some 
more comments: > is defined accordingly by (ft, ft) ! (gs 
Pt) if (exp(fs), exp(ft)) > (exp(ps), exp(gt)), constant rela- 
tive risk aversion (9) for > then reduces to (fs, ft) > (PS, 
Pt) ( fs + 6E t + e) > (Ps + , Pt + E) forE = log(E), i.e., 
it reduces to constant absolute risk aversion for >. Simi- 
larly, a linear/exponential utility model for > reduces to a 
log/power utility model for >. 
Proof of Theorem 3. For the proof that statement ii im- 
plies i, note that we have assumed attribute monotonicity. 
This implies for the multiplicative model that either U is 
everywhere positive, or everywhere negative. Now utility 
independence on C2 straightforwardly follows. Next we 
assume statement i and prove that ii holds. By Lemma 1, 
the result holds in general (including the form of U) if it 
holds in the case where C is open. Therefore let us assume 
that C is open. 
Given preferential independence, the outcome prefer- 
ence (x1, c2) > (Y1i c2) does not depend on the level of C2; 
hence, in the definition (C1)2 = {(x1, Yi) E (C1)2: ElC2 E 
C2: ((x1, c2) > (Y1, c2)}, any choice of c2 will do. Similarly, 
(C2) is defined as the set {(x2, Y2) E (C2)2: 1k1 E C1: 
((c1, x2) ; (c1, Y2)}. We define the binary relation >1 on 
(C1J)X by (xl, Yi) >1 (v1, wO) if (xlc2, ylc2) > (vlc2, wlc2) 
for some c2 E C2. In view of utility independence, the 
choice of c2 does not matter. Similarly, we define >2 on 
(C2)2 by (x2, Y2) >2 (v2, w2) if and only if (clx2, cly2) > 
(cIv2, c1w2) for some c1 E C1. 
Choose an arbitrary fixed r2 E C2, and define functions 
Vs and Vt from C1 to IR by Vs: x1 1 Us(x1r2) and Vt: x1 
U,(xlr2). Utility independence on C2 implies that for any 
x2 E C2, the function (x1, Yi) i-> Us(x1x2) + Ut(y1x2) 
represents the same binary relation on (Co)2 as (x1, Yi) 
Vs(x1) + Vt(y1), i.e., they represent >j. By the uniqueness 
result of Lemma 1,8 there must exist real s5(X2), Tr(x2), and 
positive 0#(x2) such that for all xl E C1: 
U,(x1x2) = 0-(x2)Vs(xl) + TS(X2) (C.3) 
Ut(xlx2) = 0u(x2)Vt(xl) + Tt(X2). (C.4) 
Similarly, choose an arbitrary fixed r, E C1, and define 
functions Ws and Wt from C2 to J:R by WUs x2 Us(rix2) 
and Wt: x2 1 > U,(rlx2). Utility independence on C2 implies 
that for all xl E C1, (x2, Y2) - U,(x1x2) + UI(xly2) repre- 
sents the same binary relation on W2)2 as (X2,2Y2) 
W,(x2) + W(y2), i.e., they represent >2. Again, by the 
uniqueness result of Lemma 1,9 there must exist real 
TS,(x1), <r(x1), and o-'(x.) such that 
US(xlx2) = 0u'(X1)Ws(X2) + TS (X1) (C.5) 
Ut(xlx2) = -'(X1)Wt(x2) + Tr(Xl). (C.6) 
Working in the expected utility framework with the entire 
set IR as domain, Keeney and Raiffa (Theorem 5.2) 
showed that (C.3) and (C.5) imply that 
Us(xlx2) = -asVs(xi)Ws(x2) + 3sVs(xl) 
+ 'Ys Ws (X2) + 5s (C.7) 
and (C.4) and (C.6) imply that 
Ut(xlx2) = atVt(xl)Wt(x2) + Pt3tV(X ) 
+ 
-YtWt(x2) + t , (C.8) 
where ao' fS3s YOV 6,Y av , IO Pt, y and 6t are real constants. 
Miyamoto (1983, Lemmas 1 and 2) showed that (C.7) and 
(C.8) are implied by (C.3), (C.4), (C.5), and (C.6) under 
the less restrictive assumptions adopted here. 
Equations (C.3), (C.4), (C.7), and (C.8) imply that 
-(rX2) = a, W,(x2) + Ps = tWt (X2) + Pt* (C.9) 
We now distinguish two cases. 
Case 1. (Multiplicative Case) Suppose that o-(x2) is not 
constant. In this case, (C.9) implies that as c 0 at. 
Algebraic manipulation of (C.7) and (C.8) yields that 
U*S(xlx2) ) -(X2)[Vs(X1) + Os] (C.10) 
U~t(xtx2) = 0-(X2)[Vt(Xt) + 0] , (C.11) 
where s = -y/sas, Ot = yet/at, U(xlx2) = Us(xlx2) + ysf3/5a 
- Ss, and Ut(xlx2) = Ut(XlX2) + yt43lat - 6t. By the 
uniqueness result of Lemma 1, Us* and U* are also additive 
value functions for > on C2. Moreover, by outcome 
monotonicity, the functions x1x2 ' 0-(x2)[Vs(xl) + Os] and 
x1x2 1 o-(x2)[Vt(xl) + Ot] represent the same preference 
relation > on C = C1 X C2. By the standard uniqueness 
theorem for multiplicative representations (Krantz et al. 
1971, Chapter 7), there exist A, w > 0 such that for all 
x1x2 E C2I, 
U* (xlx2) = 0-(x2)[Vs(Xl) + Os] 
= Aur(x2)w'[Vt(x1) + Otlw (C.12) 
= [U~t(XtX2)1w 
We know that 0-(x2) is nonconstant because of attribute 
monotonicity, which implies that the nondegenerate C2 is 
essential. Substituting two different values for 0#(x2) shows, 
by (C.12), that w = 1 and Vs(x1) + Os = A[Vt(x1) + Ot]. 
Hence, Us* and U* are linear with respect to each other. 
Define 4: x1 V T7,(x1) + 0t,, U.: x1x2 - 4(x1)o-(x2), it-y - 
A/(1 + A) and 1t = 1/(1 + A). Then U is multiplicative, 
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and 7TU and i7TU are continuous additive value functions 
for > on C2. 
Case 2. (Additive Case) Suppose that 0#(x2) is constant. 
Then a, - a, , 0 by (C.9), hence, by (C.7) and (C.8), the 
functions Us: x1x2 1 I39JV/(xl) + -yW,(x2) + 85 and Ut: x1x2 
_ 1tVt(Xl) + -YtWt(x2) + 6t are both additive. They repre- 
sent the same preference relation > on C = C1 X C2; by 
standard uniqueness results (Krantz et al., Chapter 6), Us 
is a linear transform of Ut, f5pV= A=,tVt + Tt and y5Ws = 
A,,ytWt + At for some A > 0 and real Ti, ct. Define 4: xl 
1tVt(Xl) + rT, i: X2 e YtWt(X2) + ,,, U: X1X2 1 4)(X1) + 
tf(x2), 7Ts = A/(1 + A), and Tt = 1/(1 + A). Then U is 
additive on C1 x C2, and (xlx2, YIY2) ' rTsU(XlX2) + 
7TU(ylY2) represents the preference order over acts. 
Proof of Theorem 4. For the proof that statement ii im- 
plies i, note that we have assumed attribute monotonicity. 
This implies for the multiplicative model that either U is 
everywhere positive or everywhere negative. Mutual utility 
independence on C2 follows straightforwardly. Next let us 
assume i and prove that ii holds. Theorem 4 is equivalent 
to Theorem 3 when n = 2. Therefore assume that n > 2. 
To complete the proof, we must show that Us and U, are 
linear with respect to each other and that Us is either 
additive or multiplicative. 
Continuity of Us and U, implies that > is a continuous 
weak order, attribute monotonicity implies that every Ck- 
being nondegenerate-is essential, and mutual utility inde- 
pendence implies preferential independence. Therefore, it 
follows by well known results that > on C is additively 
representable by continuous functions, Z1,..., Zn 
(Debreu 1960, Wakker 1989, Theorem 111.6.6). In other 
words, Z: x |-> Z1(xl) + * .* + Zn(xn) represents > on C. 
Z(C) is a nondegenerate interval because C is a product of 
nondegenerate intervals, and each Zi is continuous. Be- 
cause Us and U, are continuous functions that represent 
the same relation, >, on C, there must exist strictly in- 
creasing continuous functions, S and T, such that Us(x) = 
S(Z(x)) and U,(x) = T(Z(x)) for every x E C. Let Z(CjI 
= {(a, b) E Z(C)2: a - b}. Define an ordering >' on 
Z(C)2 by the condition 
(a, b) >' (c, d)#S(a) + T(b) - S(c) + T(d) (C.13) 
for any (a, b), (c, d) E Z(C) 2. It follows that 
(w, x) > (y, z),#(Z(w), Z(x)) >' (Z(y), Z(z)) (C. 14) 
for all acts (w, x), (y, z) E C2 . Note that for (w, x) E C2, 
w > x implies Z(w) - Z(x), i.e., rank-ordering on C2 
agrees with that on Z(C)2. Therefore, (w, x) | > (Z(w), 
Z(x)) is a mapping from C2 to Z(C)2 , and >' is the 
image relation of > under that mapping. 
We will show that for any 13 E Int[Z(C)] there exists an 
open interval B. around f3 on which >' satisfies constant 
absolute risk aversion. To prove this, we first derive the 
following lemma. Its proof is rather technical, and can be 
skipped if the reader will accept that an interval B~f as 
described there can always be constructed; constant abso- 
lute risk aversion is derived later. 
Lemma 2. For any 13 E Int[Z(C)], it is possible to choose 
an open interval B. C Z(C) around 1B that is sufficiently 
small to guarantee that for any real E, if U, v, U', v', u + E, v 
+ E, u' + E, v' + E E B., then there exist x, Yn E Cn and 
a, b, c, d E C such that Z(xna) = u, Z(xnb) = v, Z(xnc) = 
u', Z(Xnd) = V', Z(yna) = u + E, Z(ynb) = v + E, Z(ync) 
= U' + E, and Z(ynd) = v' + E. 
Proof. Choose any 1l3 E Int[Z(C)], and let x E C satisfy 
Z(x) = 13. LetAn = Int{y E IR: y = Z(wy) for some wn 
E CnJ andA~n = Int{y E IR: 'y = Z(xnw) for some w E 
C}; so An refers to variation of xn in Z(x), and An refers 
to variation of xn in Z(x). Let A + = sup{ca E IR: a = y - 
,B for some y ? An} A- = inf{oca IR: a = y - 13 for 
some y E An}, \n = sup{oa E IR: a = y - for some y 
Aj A- = inf{oa E IR: a = y-- 3 for some y E A\n 
Note that +oo - A,+ > 0 > A,7 > -oc and +oo - Axj > 0 > 
A~n -cc because 13 E An n A\n and An n An is an open 
interval. Let t = min{ A+, -A -, A+, -A-}. Now define B 
= {a: I a - 13 < ,/2}. Obviously, B. is an open interval. 
Furthermore, B. C An n A\n because of how g was de- 
fined. Finally, note that for any u, v E BP, we have |u - vI 
l u - P1 + 13 - VI < p. 
To prove that B. satisfies the claim in the lemma, 
choose any real E, and suppose that u, v, u', v', u + E, v + 
E,u' + E, v' + E EBP, andu - v, u' v'; this implies 
-y / E < g. Because B. C AXn, there exist a, b, c, d C C 
such that Z(xna) = u, Z(xnb) = v, Z(xnc) = u', and 
Z(xnd) = v'. Because - g E g ,, there exists tn ECn 
such that E = Z(tx) - Z(x) = Z(tx) - P3. Because Z is 
additive, E = Z(tna) - Z(xna) = Z(tnb) - Z(xnb) = 
Z(tnc) - Z(XnC) = Z(tnd) - Z(Xnd). Substituting values 
and rearranging terms yields Z(tna) = U + E, Z(tnb) = v + 
E, Z(tnc) = u' + E, and Z(tnd) = v' + E. We conclude that 
B. is as desired. 
We use Lemma 2 to show that >' satisfies constant 
absolute risk aversion on B,. Choose any u, v, u', v' ( BP 
such that u - v, u' - v', and choose any real E such that 
also u + E, v + E, U' + E, v' + E E B,. We need to show 
that (u, v) >' (u', v') if and only if (iff) (u + E, v + E) >' 
(u' + E, v' + E). By Lemma 2 we can choose a, b, c, d E 
C and xnw Yn E Cn such that Z(xna) = u, Z(xnb) = v, 
Z(xnc) = u', Z(xnd) = v', Z(yna) = U + E, Z(ynb) = v + 
E, Z(ync) = u' + E, and Z(ynd) = v' + E. Then (C.14) and 
utility independence imply that (u, v) >' (u', v') iff (xna, 
Xnb) > (Xnc, Xnd) iff (Yna, ynb) > (ync, ynd) if (u + E, v + 
E) >' (u' + E, v' + E). Hence, >' satisfies constant abso- 
lute risk aversion on B . 
The relation >' is a continuous weak order on (B 0)2 and 
there exists, by (C.13), a continuous additive representa- 
tion for >' on (BP)2l with strictly increasing additive value 
functions. By Theorem 1, there exist decision weights rs(I3) 
and -In(\3), and a linear/exponential function, U_ : B' - IR, 
such that (u, v) 7 1T(I3)U~(u) + rT~(f3)U~f(v) represents 
324 / MIYAMOTO AND WAKKER 
>' on (B '3)2 . By proper choice of the scale parameter a(f3) 
and the location parameter r(O3) of the exponential function 
(see (2)-(4); the parameters depend on 13) we can make 
the function 1rT(P)U,, agree with the function S in (C.13), 
and the function irT,(3)U,, with the function T - k(p3), 
where the location constant k(1) depends on P3. 
The interval Int[Z(C)] is covered by overlapping inter- 
vals Be. The decision weights 1Ts(I3) 13) the parameters 
of the exponential functions U., and thus the parameter 
k(f3), must be identical on the overlapping portions of 
these intervals, hence they must be the same on every B6, 
independent of f3 E Int[Z(C)]. Hence, S = i. U' and 
T =IT U' + k, where dependence on (3can be sup- 
pressed and U' agrees with U,, on each B,,. Now, subtract- 
ing k, (u, v) |-> 7sU'(u) + 7TU'(v) represents >' on 
Int[Z(C)]2. U' is continuous and strictly increasing be- 
cause S is. 
Define U: C -> IR by U: x | > U'(Z(x)). By (C.14), the 
function (x, y) -> i7rsU(x) + irtU(y) preserves > on 
Z(C)2 . If U' is linear, then U is linear, and U: xF-> aZ(x) 
+ T is additive. If U' is nonlinear, i.e., U': u |-> aeu + T 
for A 0 0, then let Uj: xi | > exp(AZi(xi)) for each i E N. 
Subtract T, and it follows that U: x-> alUl(x1) ... * U(xn) is 
multiplicative. 
Proof of Theorem 5. We define C% as the product XjkCj, 
and denote its elements as x~k, etc.; (XkZ%) is an alternative 
notation for XkZ. First suppose that statement ii holds; we 
derive i. Fix any rxk E Cxk, and define Uk: Ck -- IR by Uk: 
Xk H-> U(xkrxk). By attribute monotonicity, this function is 
not constant. Because U is multilinear, for any zk E C?, 
the function xk F-* U(xkz~k) is a linear transform of Uk, i.e., 
it is of the form o - Uk + T; by attribute monotonicity, oa is 
positive. Therefore, preferences (xkzxk, Ykz\k) > (xkzxk, 
YkZ\k) on C2 are independent of z%,, i.e., attribute k is 
utility independent on C2. 
To prove that statement i implies ii, assume that i holds. 
By Lemma 1, the result holds in general if it holds for the 
case where C is open, therefore assume that C is open. To 
complete the proof, we must show that Us and U, are 
linear with respect to each other, and that Us is multilin- 
ear. The proof is by induction on the number of factors. 
For n = 2, C = C1 X C2. Now Theorem 5 follows from 
Theorem 3 because for two attributes mutual utility inde- 
pendence is equivalent to utility independence of single 
factors, and a function is multilinear if and only if it is 
additive/multiplicative. Hence Theorem 5 holds for n = 2. 
Now assume that Theorem 5 holds for n - 2 factors, 
and let us prove it for n + 1 factors. Let N = {1, . .. , n + 
1}. Define the set of rank-ordered acts over Ck by (Ck) 2 
= {(Xk, Yk) E (Ck)2 such that xkz > ykz for some z E C}, 
and define the preference order over these acts by (Xk, Yk) 
Ok (Vk, Wk) if and only if (xkz, ykz) > (vkz, wkz) for some z. 
Because of utility independence of each factor Ck, the 
choice of z can be arbitrary, the defined sets are indeed 
rank-ordered sets, and, for each za (Xi, (x,-z, yz) E C2 if and 
only if (Xk, Yk) E (Ck) 2 - 
For each k E N, choose an arbitrary r E C and define 
functions Ok and Ak from Ck to IR by Ok: Xk H-> Us(xkr) and 
Ak: Xk | > U,(xkr). The utility independence of Ck implies 
that (Xk, Yk) H-> kk(Xk) + Ak(Yk) represents -k on (Ck) . 
For any zxk E C%, (Xk, Yk) H-> Us(XkZ\.k) + Ut(ykz\k) also 
represents >k on (Ck)j because Ck is utility independent. 
By the uniqueness result of Lemma 1, there exist real 
Tk(Zk), Uk(zk), and positive Jk(Z\k) for any zk E CA such 
that for all Xk E Ck, 
Us(xkz\k) = 0Uk(Z\k)Pk(Xk) + Tk(Z\k) (C.15) 
Ut (XkZ\k) = 0Uk (Z\k) Ak (Xk) + 'k (Z\k) (C.16) 
Miyamoto (1983, Lemma 2) showed that if (C.15) and 
(C.16) hold for every k E N, then there exist constants dj 
and ej such that 
Us: xl-> E d H f k k(Xk) (C.17) 
JCN keJ 
Ut: X -> E e yJJ Ak(Xk) (C.18) 
JCN kEJ 
for some constants dj and ej. Because Us and Ut are con- 
tinuous, Ok and Ak are also continuous for every k C N. 
We show that Ok and Ak are linear with respect to each 
other for every k E N. 
Arbitrarily choose k E N, and rk E Ck. Define an order- 
ing, Ark, on (Cxk)2 by (x\k, yak) Ark (V7k, W\k) if (rkXk, rky\k) 
> (rkv\k, rkw\k). Let (C\k)2 = {(X\k, yk) E (C\k)2: X\k Ark 
y\kj denote the rank-ordered acts over C\k relative to Ark. 
This notation refers explicitly to rk C Ck because >rk and 
(C\rk)2 may change for different choices of rk. Because C\k 
is a product of n factors, the induction hypothesis implies 
that there exists a multilinear function Frk: C\k -- IR and 
decision weights 7rs rk and 7rtrk such that (x\k, y\k) i> 
rsrkfrk(x\k) + Ttrkfrk(y\k) represents >rk on (C,,k)2. Let 
Frk = YJCM{k} bj lI mEj (wm be the representation of Frk as 
a multilinear function, where cwm: Cm -> IR for m C 
'A{k}, and bj is a constant for each J C M{k}. But (x\k, 
y\k) l-> Us(rkx\k) + Ut(rky\k) represents >Ak on (C\rk)2 be- 
cause Us and Ut represent > on C2 . By the uniqueness of 
additive representations, there exists an a > 0 and Ts, Tt 
such that alUs(rkx\k) + Ts = TsrkFrk(x\k) and aU,(rkx\k) + 
Tt = 7Ttrkfrk(X\k) for every x\k C k. Therefore, for any x\k 
E C\, Frk(x\k) = (a,/Tsrk)Us(rkX\k) + (Ts/ITs,rk) = 
(a/17Ttrk)Ut(rkx\k) + (Tt/I77trk). Miyamoto (1983, Lemma 3) 
showed that if multilinear functions are equal, then their 
component functions are linear with respect to each other. 
Thus, for every m C N\{k} there exist constants em > 0 
and ;m such that 
Am = am4(m + Cm* (C.19) 
Moreover, since k was initially chosen arbitrarily, there 
must exist constants ak and Ck such that (C.19) also holds 
for m = k. Substituting m (Am + Cm for Am for every m C 
N in (C.18) yields, 
Ut: Xl > E ho H1 tmk(xm), (C.20) 
JON mEJ 
MIYAMOTO AND WAKKER / 325 
where hj is a constant for each J C N. It is possible to write 
a recursive formula that determines the values of hj in 
terms of the values of Eam, A'm, and ej, for every m E N, and 
every ej in (C.18) (see Miyamoto 1983, Lemma 3). We 
omit this formula because it is not needed in this proof. 
By the Structural Assumption 1, there exists a strictly 
increasing, continuous function M such that Us = M - Ut. 
Combining (C.17) with (C.20) yields 
E dH l (k(Xk) = M h- yH kk(Xk)1 (C.21) 
JCN kEJ JCN kcJ 
for every x E C. This implies that M is linear, as can be 
seen by varying only one attribute Xk, and keeping all other 
attributes fixed. Then M(J * k(Xk)) = a' * k(xk) for con- 
stants I, l', and the first derivative of M is Y/'/, i.e., it is 
constant, for the arguments in question. This can be ex- 
tended to the entire domain of M. 
Let a > 0 and 13 be the real constants such that U, = 
aoUs + 13. Let U = (1 + a)Us, 1rs = 1/(1 + a) and Irt = 
a/(1 + a). Then U is continuous and multilinear because 
Us is continuous and multilinear, and (x, y) |-> 1rsU(x) + 
IrTU(y) represents > on C2 because (x, y) F-* Us(x) + 
U,(y) represents > on Cl. 
NOTES 
1. Thereby yielding a positive answer to the open question 
stated at the end of Section VII.7 there. 
2. This parametrization can be justified by convergence 
arguments and is convenient in the proofs that follow. 
3. The results of this section and the next section can be 
derived for more general spaces C1 and C2. This is 
briefly discussed at the end of Appendix B. 
4. A complication is that in these theories, outcomes in 
lotteries should be distinct (and nondifferent). Hence, 
preference conditions and representations are initially 
only given on lotteries (p, x; 1 - p, y) with x > y. To 
invoke our theorems, the preference conditions and 
representations are first extended by continuity to the 
case x - y. 
5. First, V should satisfy a joint monotonicity condition in 
outcome and probability, i.e., if q > p and y > x, then 
V(y, q) - V(y, p) - V(x, q) + V(x, p) > 0, with 
equality if y - x. Second, V should be continuous in 
outcome. Finally, continuity in probability can be im- 
posed. Continuity in the sense of weak convergence 
implies both continuity in outcome and continuity in 
probability. 
6. Write V(y, q) - V(y, p) - V(x, q) + V(x, p) = [w(q) 
- w(p)][U(y) - U(x)]. Substitution of p = 0 and q = 1 
shows that U represents preferences over certain out- 
comes, this in turn implies that w(q) > w(p) for q > p. 
7. V should satisfy a joint monotonicity condition in out- 
comes and events, i.e., if B D A, B * A, andy > x, then 
V(y, B) - V(y, A) - V(x, B) + V(x, A) > 0, with 
equality if y v x. In addition, V should be continuous in 
outcome. 
8. Here we use the implication of utility independence 
that, by the definition of >1, (C1)' is a rank-ordered 
set. 
9. Note that (C2)2 is a rank-ordered set. 
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